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Summary
The author analyzes EU’s response to the ongoing economic crisis, focusing 
on the problem of legislative and institutional fragmentation. She argues 
that the authoritarian crisis management – fueled by “crisis” discourse - 
subverted democratic accountability by its reliance on executive discretion and 
intergovernmentalism. Through an analysis of European Court of Justice’s case 
law as well as a close look at the exact workings and implications of European 
Central Bank’s ultra vires actions, she shows how Lisbon Treaty was sacrificed 
to the exigency of creating an Ersatz Union law more pliable to the immediate 
concerns of reforming the EMU. She holds that the intergovernmental instruments 
not only “unconstitutionally” requisitioned the involvement of EU institutions, 
but also established a political administration unresponsive to democratic 
accountability, damaging the legitimacy of the Union. The resulting subjugation 
of the political and social constitution to economic conditions threatens an 
abdication of law and undermines the integrity of the Union legal order.
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1 Jürgen Habermas’s appraisal of the mode of governance in the euro crisis which stresses the 
central role of the heads of states and government of the EU Member States, convened in 
the European Council or other inter-governmental settings: “in order to ensure the political 
implementation of all goals agreed upon with their colleagues in Brussels, the heads of 
government would organize majorities in their respective national parliaments under threat 
of sanctions. This kind of executive federalism of a self-authorizing European Council of 
the seventeen [now nineteen – A.H.V.] would provide the template for a post-democratic 
exercise of democratic authority” – The Crisis of the European Union: A Response (translated 
by Ciaran P. Cronin), Polity, 2012, p. viii.
2  This paper has been completed through the Zagreb Faculty of Law’s 2016 research program 
titled „New Croatian legal system“.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The economic crisis brought change to EU’s constitutional balance, primarily 
in the field of the euro-zone. Emergency-driven economic governance in the 
Union pushed for strong deference by the courts reviewing the legal instruments 
involved. The European Central Bank (ECB) has become a governing body with 
limited accountability in the institutionally and legislatively fragmented3 Europe of 
a “new form of law”4 that reformed the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with 
the approval of an unduly deferential Court of Justice (ECJ), who is blessing the 
engagement of EU institutions outside of the Treaty’s constitutional matrix. National 
courts have attempted to clarify the boundaries of the involved EU institutions’ 
competences, invoking the ultra vires doctrine against ECB’s Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) program (the Gauweiler saga) and citing constitutional identity 
concerns (Portuguese Constitutional Tribunal). 
Some of the most important issues of these developments in the European 
economic constitution are: the legality of the “esoteric”5 crisis management 
tools reshaping the EMU; sustainability of the “emergency” discourse fueling 
them; accommodation of the double role of EU institutions in intergovernmental 
arrangements (amalgamating decision-making on policies that differ in democratic 
input legitimacy requirements); reconsideration of ECB’s accountability in a 
no longer rule-, but policy-based EMU; and the need for deference to technical 
economic choices of a (permanent?) crisis to be replaced by strict(er) judicial 
review.
2. EARLY CRISIS-MANAGEMENT TOOLS
It would be an oversimplification to consider the effects of the crisis as 
contained to EU’s economic constitution. This constitutional crisis also saw a 
fundamental shift in political and social dimensions, affecting democracy and 
social rights.6 The root of the problem lies in “the Maastricht asymmetry”7, i.e. 
a combination of transnational monetary policy and fragmented national fiscal 
policies. The EMU centralized monetary policy for the euro-area8, entrusting the 
3  Tuori, K., The European Financial Crisis – Constitutional Aspects and Implications, European 
University Institute, EUI Working Paper - Law 2012/28, 2012, p. 1.
4  Peers, S., Towards a New Form of EU Law? The use of EU Institutions outside the EU Legal 
Framework, European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 9, 2013, p. 37.
5  Fahey, E.; Bardutzky, S., Judicial Review of Eurozone Law: The Adjudication of Postnational 
Norms in the EU Courts, Plural, Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 1, 2013, p. 102.
6  Tuori, K., The European…, cit., p. 2.
7  Ibid., p. 5. It’s a “decisive birth defect” – Sauer, H., Doubtful it Stood…: Competence and 
Power in European Monetary and Constitutional Law in the Aftermath of the CJEU’s OMT 
Judgment, German Law Journal, vol. 16, 4/2015, p. 973.
8  Art. 3(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter: TFEU), [2012] 
OJ C326, pp. 47-390. 
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achievement of its telos (price stability9) to a technocratic and independent ECB and 
the national central banks.10 Member States still remained sovereign in the field of 
fiscal policy, limited only by a coordinating role of the Union11 and the primacy of 
exclusively “European” monetary policy.12 Their fiscal responsibility was insured 
by the interest rates’ dependence on the soundness of a State’s finances. In lieu of 
auxiliary precautions, the Treaty precluded a bailout in case of default (Art. 125(1) 
TFEU) as well as central-bank financing of government spending (Art. 123(1) 
TFEU); it also blocked privileged access to financial institutions by the public sector 
(Art. 124 TFEU) and forbade excessive budget deficit and government debt (Art. 
126 TFEU). The national fiscal policies are coordinated through the Stability and 
Growth Pact13, while Protocol No. 14 annexed to the Treaties on the Euro Group 
“constitutionalizes” the euro-area-only rendition of the ECOFIN Council.14
Belying adequacy of these precautions, the sovereign debt crisis caught the EU 
unprepared. Dealing with the crisis necessitated a coordinated effort on two planes: 
1) palliative – focusing on financial stabilization through emergency assistance 
(European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM)15, European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF)16 and ESM) and regaining the trust of the financial markets 
9  Arts. 119(2) and 127(1) TFEU.
10  Art. 130 TFEU. ECB and national central banks form the European System of Central Banks 
(hereinafter: ESCB) – Art. 282 TFEU.
11  Arts. 120 and 121 TFEU.
12  Art. 119 TFEU. 
13  Concluded in 1997 and encompassing Council Regulations 1466/97 and 1467/97 (hereinafter: 
SGP). Regulation 1466/97 (amended by Council Regulation 1175/2011) is the “preventive 
arm” based on Art. 121 TFEU, assessing the consistency of national economic policies 
with broad economic guidelines. For the euro-zone states, the information necessary for 
multilateral surveillance is contained in their “Stability programmes”, stating the medium-
term objective (hereinafter: MTO) for the budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus 
and the adjustment path towards this objective. The “corrective arm” (Regulation 1467/97, 
amended by Council Regulation 1177/2011) is grounded in Art. 126 TFEU and regulates the 
excessive deficit procedure. The SGP was expanded in 2011 with three more Regulations 
(1173/2011, 1174/2011 and 1176/2011) and a Directive (2011/85/EU), and was renamed as 
the “Six-pack”. In 2013, another two Regulations (472/2013 and 473/2013 - the “Two-pack”) 
joined the fold.
14  The Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) consists of the economics and finance 
Ministers of the Member States. It is responsible for economic policy, taxation matters, 
financial markets and capital movements, and prepares the EU’s annual budget. Monthly 
meetings of the informal Euro Group take place on the eve of the ECOFIN meetings, with 
the participation of the President of the ECB and of the Commissioner for economic and 
financial affairs, with the task of discussing questions related to the „specific responsibilities 
they share with regard to the single currency“ – Protocol No. 14.
15  Council Regulation (EU) No. 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial 
stabilisation mechanism [2010] OJ L 118/1.
16  An intergovernmental Special Purpose Vehicle incorporated as an LLC under Luxembourg 
law on 7 June 2010, and funded by the euro-area States in accordance with their share in the 
paid-up capital of the ECB - Bertocchi, M. and others, Euro Bonds: Markets, Infrastructure 
and Trends, World Scientific Series in Finance, vol. 7, Singapore, World Scientific, 2014, 
p. 30. The representatives of all the EU Member States adopted a decision allowing the 
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(Asset Purchases Programmes (APPs) and OMT), and 2) strategic – strengthening 
economic governance against shocks (“Six-pack”, “Two-pack”, and the Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(TSCG) with its “Fiscal Compact”17). The palliative efforts were objects of 
improvisation18: the first Greek rescue package in 2010 used intergovernmental 
agreements outside of the Treaty framework, while the adjustment program was 
detailed in a memorandum19 between Greece and the Commission, the ECB and the 
IMF. The intergovernmental method was again used with the EFSF, achieving an 
unprincipled merger which later served as a template for the ESM: the Treaty was 
sidestepped and the EU institutions’ personal and technical expertise outsourced20 
for the negotiation, completion and enforcement of EFSF activities. Most 
unsettlingly, “conditionality…[was] ensured by including the essential contents of 
MoUs in Council Decisions…[so] that actually the MoUs determine and constrain 
the contents of the Council decisions and not vice versa!“.21
3. EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM (ESM)
3.1. Establishment
As the crisis deepened, the European Council agreed in December 2010 on 
the need for euro-area states to establish a permanent stability mechanism that 
would assume EFSF/EFSM’s tasks. While the EFSM was (shakily) established on 
Commission’s involvement in the EFSF - Extraordinary ECOFIN meeting, Brussels, 
9/10 May 2010, Press release 9596/10. The euro-area States then concluded a Framework 
Agreement with it, making the overall legal nature of the Vehicle “difficult to define” – Tuori, 
K., The European…, cit., p. 13. Following the by then established precedent, the Agreement 
postulated a strict conditionality of assistance - Recital 2 of the Preamble of the EFSF 
Framework Agreement, available on the ESM’s website at <https://www.esm.europa.eu/
sites/default/files/20111019_efsf_framework_agreement_en.pdf>. Throughout the paper, 14 
March 2017 is to be considered date of access to any and all cited Internet resources.
17  Signed on 2 March 2012 by all the Heads of State or Government of the EU Member States 
with the exception of the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom and Republic of Croatia. It 
entered into force on 1 January 2013 – Fiscal Compact Treaty: Scorecard for 2015, European 
Parliament Research Service, PE 581,403, June 2016, p. 7. 
18  Tuori, K., The European…, cit., p. 12.
19  The Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter: MoU) on Specific Economic Policy 
Conditionality, The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, Occasional Papers No. 61, 
3 May 2010, pp. 59-84. 
20  Sester, P., The role of ECB in relation to the modified EFSF and the future ESM, <https://
www2.uni-hamburg.de/fachbereiche-einrichtungen/handelsrecht/ECFR_/Sester.pdf>, p. 27. 
All of the websites referenced in this paper have been accessed on 8 March 2017.
21  Tuori, K.; Tuori, K., The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis, Cambridge University 
Press, 2014, p. 155. With the adoption of the “Two-pack’s” provisions on macroeconomic 
adjustment programs, however, the beneficiary Member States first have to prepare such 
programs, which then have to be complied with by a subsequently concluded MoU – ibid., p. 
157.
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the emergency-relief provision in Art. 122 TFEU, it couldn’t have served as the 
fundament of a permanent mechanism. So on 25 March 2011, the European Council 
adopted a Decision22 amending Art. 136 TFEU by a simplified revision procedure23, 
enabling the euro-states to establish the ESM if it should prove “indispensable to 
safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole” (new par.3). Furthermore, “The 
granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made 
subject to strict conditionality”. The ESM Treaty was signed by all euro-area States 
on 2 February 2012, and became operational on 8 October 2012. However, the 
“legitimizing” amendment of Art. 136 entered into force only on 1 May 2013. This 
prompted doubts as to the legality of the ESM, established as it (seemingly) was 
without a Treaty basis. 
Moreover, the legality of the amendment itself (whenever it entered into 
force) was questioned, since the simplified revision procedure precludes the 
expansion of Union competences. Misgivings were compounded by a repeat 
recourse to the intergovernmental method that shirked the Treaty-based options 
of enhanced cooperation or use of Article 352 TFEU (see infra), and shielded the 
ESM participants from adherence to provisions of the Treaty and its Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (CFR). Such willingness to circumstep options of housing the 
ESM within the EU constitutional architecture led to the question of legality of EU 
institutions’ involvement in implementing an international agreement concluded 
outside the EU framework.24
3.2. The Pringle case
These doubts were addressed by the ECJ in Pringle.25 The Court concluded 
that the ability of the Member States to enter into a separate agreement removed 
from the EU framework is not contingent upon a special authorization in the 
Treaties (par. 68 and 72)26, since the activities of the ESM do not fall within the 
22  Decision 2011/199 amending Article 136 TFEU with regard to a stability mechanism for 
Member States whose currency is the euro [2011] OJ L91/1.
23  Art. 48(6) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU - [2012] OJ C326, pp. 13-46) provides 
for a simplified revision procedure regarding the provisions of Part Three of the TFEU 
relating to the internal policies and action of the Union. In such cases, TFEU is amended 
by a unanimous decision of the European Council, after consulting the European Parliament 
and the Commission (and the ECB in case of institutional changes of the monetary area). 
The decision enters into force upon approval by the Member States. The „rub“ lies in the 3rd 
subparagraph: „The decision…shall not increase the competences conferred on the Union in 
the Treaties“.
24  De Witte, B., Using International Law in the Euro Crisis: Causes and Consequences, Oslo, 
Centre for European Studies, Working Paper No. 4, June 2013, p. 18.
25  Case C-370/12 Thomas Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney General, 
27 November 2012.
26  Even if a stability mechanism could’ve been established on the basis of Article 352 TFEU 
(as suggested by the European Parliament in its Resolution of 13 March 2014 on the enquiry 
on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area program countries 
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realm of monetary policy (exclusive competence of the Union – par.95), but 
constitute “only” an economic policy measure. As there is no field pre-emption in 
the field of economic policy, states are free to conclude agreements under private 
and international law - if the principles of supremacy and sincere cooperation are 
honored and there is no contradiction to EU primary or secondary legislation27 (cf. 
Pringle, paras.109 and 148). Subjection of ESM programs to strict conditionality 
(per amended Art. 136 TFEU) provides insurance against their non-compliance 
with EU law (par. 72). 
This is an analysis we consider to be piecemeal and lacking an overarching 
perspective. According to the Court, the purpose of the ESM is “not to maintain 
price stability” (a monetary policy concern and EU’s exclusive competence), but 
“to meet the financing requirements of the ESM Members…if indispensable to 
safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole” (par. 96). The activities 
of the ESM might well influence the rate of inflation, but “only [as an] indirect 
consequence” (par. 97). The levity of negating the obvious is strongest where ECJ 
holds that “Even though the stability of the euro area may have repercussions on 
the stability of the currency used, an economic policy measure cannot be treated 
as equivalent to a monetary policy measure for the sole [even if very substantial 
– AHV] reason that it may have indirect effects on the stability of the euro” (par. 
56).28 Confusing the nominal with the substantive29, the Court glosses over the fact 
that the stability of the euro area as the purpose of the ESM is inseparable from the 
stability of the euro itself30. The two terms are virtually synonymous, motivating the 
(2013/2277(INI), p. 108)). Its Resolution of 24 June 2015 (on the review of the economic 
governance framework: stocktaking and challenges (2014/2145(INI)) qualifies the ESM 
as a „setback to the political integration of the Union“ and calls for the ESM to be fully 
integrated into the community framework so it could finally be made accountable to the 
Parliament (par. 51). There is a good case against the Commission’s participation in the 
ESM, as “where the contracting states have not used enhanced cooperation [where it was 
available] this should incline the EU institution against participation…[This position] should 
be regarded as especially strong if the states have not even considered in good faith…[such] 
enhanced cooperation” – Craig, P., Pringle and Use of EU Institutions outside the EU Legal 
Framework: Foundations, Procedure and Substance, Oxford, Oxford Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 96/2013, 9 September 2013, p. 17.
27  Tuori, K.; Tuori, K., op. cit., p. 155. This is „the most powerful format of federal pre-
emption: any national legislation within the occupied field is prohibited. The reason for the 
total exclusion lies in the perceived fear that any supplementary national action may endanger 
of interfere with the strict uniformity of Union law“ –Schütze, R., European Union Law, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 135.
28  Therefore, measures taken with a view to protecting the stability of the euro area „as a whole“ 
(Article 136(3) TFEU) may have repercussions on the stability of the currency used within 
that area (monetary policy concern), but such indirect effects do not alter its economic policy 
character – paras. 56 and 96.
29  „This is, with respect, legal formalism“ – Craig, P., Pringle: Legal Reasoning, Text, Purpose 
and Teleology, Maastricht, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, vol. 20, 
1/2013, p. 5.
30  These two concepts have „complementary functions“ – de Lhoneux, E.; Vassilopoulos, 
C., The European Stability Mechanism before the Court of Justice of the European Union: 
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Member States to action by fear of the domino effect linking one State’s default/
financing difficulties with defaults/business difficulties of its creditors (mostly large 
banks), which would in turn spell difficulties for the rest of the euro area.31 Given 
that the member states are individually responsible for the rescue of their (for some 
states mammoth) banking systems the fiscal consequences of rescuing banks are 
very large, spilling the stress in the banking system over to the sovereigns.32 ECB’s 
Quantitative Easing (QE – see infra 4.3.2.) program, while pumping liquidity into 
the system in an effort to achieve the target inflation of 2%, shields banks from 
such exposure to default and uses them as intermediaries in circumventing the 
primary financing prohibition, ridding them of (risky) government bonds assets. 
The interconnectedness of QE (purportedly designed to raise inflation) and the ESM 
(see infra 4.3.2.) all but disqualifies the ECJ’s conclusion of the ESM’s “indirect” 
and tangential connection to the monetary policy.
3.3. Strict conditionality and MoUs’ congruence with EU law
The Court has deservedly attracted criticism for its conclusion that strict 
conditionality of ESM’s programs ensures compliance with EU law in general as 
well as with the TFEU’s “no bail-out” provision (Pringle, paras. 69 and 111). 
Regarding the latter, financial rescue efforts run the obvious risk of causing 
moral hazard problems33 for the borrowing countries, who might not be induced 
to fiscal consolidation if anticipating a “safety net”. Addressing this issue of 
ESM’s credibility, the Court interpreted Art. 125 TFEU as not prohibiting mutual 
financial assistance between Member States but rather as barring the imposition of 
liability for the commitments of one upon others (par.130). The goal is to ensure 
sound budgetary policy and discipline, and States’ subjection to market logic 
when entering into debt (par.135) - strict conditionality assures that such sound 
policy wouldn’t be dis-incentivized (paras.135-136; cf. par.111). Also assuring 
congruence with Art. 125 TFEU, assistance is activated only by a peril to financial 
stability of the whole euro area (paras.136-137) – this particular proviso is hard 
to explain, since it recognizes the existence of an overarching aim over Art. 125. 
Comments on the Pringle Case, Springer, 2013, p. 25. It is “not clear how there could be 
price stability in relation to the euro, given the serious instability of the euro area as a whole” 
– Craig, P., Pringle: Legal Reasoning, cit., p. 5.
31  Fabbrini, F.; Hirsch Ballin, E.; Somsen, H., What Form of Government for the European 
Union and the Eurozone?, Bloomsburry Publishing, 2015, p. 198.
32  Merler, S.; Pisani-Ferry, J., Hazardous tango, Bruegel, <http://bruegel.org/2012/04/
hazardous-tango-sovereign-bank-interdependence-and-financial-stability-in-the-euro-area/>, 
15 April 2012. If robbed of access to their primary lenders, states (especially high-deficit 
ones on the periphery of the Union) would either default or (more likely) turn to their central 
banks - who would be pressured into raising the volume of money in circulation, leading to 
price instability
33  Badinger, H.; Nitsch, V., Routledge Handbook of the Economic of European Integration, 
Routledge, 2015, p. 146.
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Tuoris’ concern is that this “higher-order telos” could be “used broadly to derogate 
from the bailout prohibition” and increase the risk of financial instability that 
it aims to prevent.34 Such significant changes to the constitutional foundations of 
the EMU should not be introduced, or rubberstamped, by a court35, as it moves the 
EMU from a rule- to a policy-based union - with important consequences for its 
democratic legitimacy. Joerges find that such a move ushers in managerialism and 
policy-making36, and that the new economic constitution is being implemented by a 
“political administration” insulated from democratic legitimation and accountability 
demanded by the rule of law.37 Its core concepts cannot be precisely defined, making 
them non-justiciable and suspending the legal protection requirements38 - instead of 
a reasoned framework for new economic governance, the Court merely “parrot[s] 
the orthodoxy of ‘conditionality’ as a justification”.39
The ESM Treaty also places procedural safeguards against incongruence of a 
MoU and EU law. An ESM Member’s request for stability support is assessed by 
the Commission in liaison with the ECB40, and followed by a decision of the Board 
of Governors41 to grant stability support. That Board then entrusts the Commission 
(again in liaison with the ECB and the IMF) with negotiating a MoU detailing the 
conditionality that is then annexed to the Financial Assistance Facility Agreement 
between the Member State and the ESM. The MoU must be “fully consistent” with 
measures of economic policy coordination, in particular with any act of European 
34  Tuori, K.; Tuori, K., op. cit., p. 130.
35  Dawson, M.; Enderlein, H.; Joerges, C., Beyond the Crisis: The Governance of Europe’s 
Economic, Political and Legal Transformation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, 
p. 117. Scicluna’s view is that “the euro crisis has expedited the ECJ’s transformation 
from vanguard of European integration to laggard” – Scicluna, N., European Union 
Constitutionalism in Crisis, Routledge, 2015, p. 133. It’s her opinion that the euro rescue has 
left the Court deposed – loc. cit. 
36  ibid., p. 117.
37  Everson, M.; Joerges, C., Who is the Guardian for Constitutionalism in Europe after the 
Financial Crisis?, LSE “Europe in Question” Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 63/2013, 
June 2013, p. 13.
38  ibid., pp. 13-14. Evaluation of Member States’ performance is “highly discretionary”. 
Economist Andrew Watt’s analysis of the Commission’s review of 13 EU countries 
considered to have macroeconomic imbalances characterized the Commission’s language 
as opaque „gobbledygook“ – EU Commission Makes a Mockery of Imbalance Procedure, 
Social Europe, <https://www.socialeurope.eu/2013/04/eu-commission-makes-a-mockery-of-
imbalance-procedure/>, 11 April 2013.
39  Everson, M.; Joerges, C., op. cit., p. 21.
40  This assessment includes the existence of a risk to the financial stability of the euro area as 
a whole or of its Member States, the sustainability of public debt, and the actual or potential 
financing needs of the ESM Member concerned – Art. 13(1) of the ESM Treaty (hereinafter: 
ESMT, available at the official website of <https://www.esm.europa.eu/legal-documents/esm-
treaty />).
41  Each ESM Member appoints one Governor, who is that State’s minister of finance (Article 
5 ESMT). The Board of Governors is tasked with providing stability support by the ESM, 
including the economic policy conditionality as stated in the MoU, and establishing the 
choice of instruments and financial terms and conditions (Art. 5(6(f)) ESMT).
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Union law (Art.13(3) ESMT). Under Art. 16 ESMT, where financial assistance is 
given in the form of a loan42, the MoU has to detail a macro-economic adjustment 
program (MEAP), which is a creature of the “Two-pack” Regulation 472/2013/EU. 
Article 7 of that Regulation provides that a draft MEAP is prepared in agreement 
with the Troika; the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall approve 
the MEAP, while the Commission shall ensure its strict observance in the MoU 
signed by the Commission on behalf of the ESM. Such signature is given after the 
MoU’s approval by the Board of Governors (effectively the Euro Group, as per their 
identical composition - Art.13(4) ESMT). The engagement of the Troika doesn’t end 
there, as they are also tasked with monitoring compliance with the conditionality 
(Art. 13(7) ESMT). 
The economic strictness of financial assistance conditionality has grown 
since 2010.43 As a corollary of fiscal discipline and consolidation, MEAPs mandate 
structural reforms of public sector core activities and make EFSF/ESM MoUs’ 
reliance on austerity measures suspect due to their impact on the equilibrium 
between the economic and social dimension of the EU.44 The conditionality in 
assistance programs for Greece, Ireland and Portugal clashed with their visions 
of a welfare state in a way that went beyond the limits imposed by the Treaties.45 
Developments of this kind force national actors into defensive positions, shielding 
the uncompromising features of their national constitutional systems from untenable 
re-definition. 
In the paradigmatic Portuguese case, on 5 July 2012 the Constitutional Tribunal 
declared a 2012 budget provision suspending payment of the 13th and 14th monthly 
salary for public sector employees unconstitutional. While acknowledging that the 
budget was adopted pursuant to the MoU (as a condition for loans), the Tribunal 
found that it still violated the constitutional right to equality and proportionality.46 
On 5 April 2013, it struck down several provisions of the budget law for 2013.47 On 
42  I.e. not in the form of one of the other assistance facilities envisaged by the ESMT– purchase 
of bonds in the primary and secondary markets, precautionary program and recapitalization 
of financial institutions (banks) through loans to governments (Arts. 14-18 ESMT). ESM’s 
initial lending volume (consolidated with that of the EFSF) is €500 billion (Art. 39 ESMT).
43  Ioannidis, M., How strict is „strict conditionality“? The new Eurozone agreement on 
Greece, European Law Blog, < http://europeanlawblog.eu/2015/03/19/how-strict-is-strict-
conditionality-the-new-eurozone-agreement-on-greece/>, 19 March 2015.
44  Costamagna, F., Saving Europe „under strict conditionality“: A threat for EU social 
dimension?, Torino, Centro Luigi Einaudi, Working Paper No. 7, 2012, p. 12.
45  ibid., p. 15.
46  The Constitution „prevents economic and social objectives from prevailing, without limits, on 
the principles…which the Constitution defends“ – Acórdao No. 353/2012, par. 6, translated 
in Fabbrini, F., Economic Governance in Europe: Comparative Paradoxes and Constitutional 
Challenges, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 87.
47  Acórdao No. 187/2013 - the Court only dealt with the „international arm“ of the rescue 
package (the MoU and Financial and Assistance Programme with the EFSF), while neglecting 
the „EU side“ of the assistance (the EFSM). The MoU was treated as legally binding and 
providing for direct legal constraints upon the Portuguese constitutional system – Fasone, 
C., Constitutional Courts Facing the Euro Crisis: Italy, Portugal and Spain in a Comparative 
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19 December 2013 it pruned parts of the budget law for 2014 that reduced pensions 
of public sector workers and infringed the principle of legitimate expectations.48 
This should be recognized as an implicit invocation of the constitutional identity 
narrative, highlighting the significance of social rights and equality in the Portuguese 
constitutional tradition.49 Gaining momentum, on 14 August 2014 the Tribunal fully 
unveiled its stance toward EU crisis law, finding Council’s recommendation to be 
binding only in its objectives and not the national means employed.50 Approximation 
of national legislation to the EU standard cannot release it from its obligation of 
fidelity to the Constitution: “domestic norms necessarily have to comply with the 
Constitution”.51 
As of 1 March 2013, assistance from the ESM is also conditioned upon 
ratification of the (“complementary”52) intergovernmental TSCG and compliance 
with the requirements of its Title III (“Fiscal Compact”) Article 3. Most of what the 
TSCG contains in terms of economic governance could have been adopted by EU 
legislation53, but the German government (a perennial EU agenda setter) considered 
the new balanced budget commitment to be more permanent if “constitutionalized” 
in the TFEU.54 After the UK government refused to agree on this amendment in 
December 2011, a separate treaty became the agreed venue for circumvention of 
the veto. In taking the “risk of engaging in this new and unpredictable treaty game”, 
time was not taken “to consider whether…the wisest course might have been to 
adopt EU legislation through enhanced cooperation”55. Article 3 of the TSCG 
stipulates that the Contracting Parties’ budgetary positions be balanced or in surplus, 
and that this obligation be enforced by way of “provisions of binding force and 
permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully 
respected and adhered to throughout the national budgetary processes” (par. 2). 
This means that the annual structural balance of the general government 
should be at its country-specific MTO - tethering the ESM to the “Six-pack” in the 
same way the strict conditionality element ties it to the “Two-pack”. Integration of 
intergovernmental agreements and EU secondary legislation is therefore complete, 
intertwining the instruments in an organic way that defies the jurisdictional/
Perspective, Florence, European University Institute, Max Weber Programme 2014/25, p. 
48. In comparison, the Greek Council of State considered the MoUs as declaratory political 
plans, not binding instruments – see Decision 668/2012 [28], cited by Hinarejos, A., The 
Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 
146.
48  Fasone, C., ibid., pp. 28 and 48.
49  ibid., p. 48.
50  ibid., p. 49.
51  loc. cit. Unsurprisingly, the Commission’s reaction to the Tribunal’s decisions treated the 
Tribunal’s verdict “as a hindrance that could not be allowed” – Scicluna, N., op. cit., p. 135.
52  Recital 5 ESMT. 
53  De Witte, B., op. cit., p. 8, and Curtin, D., Challenging Executive Dominance in European 
Democracy, Modern Law Review, vol. 77, 1/2014, p. 10.
54  De Witte, B., loc. cit.
55  ibid., p. 9.
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organizational disparities between them. Reinforcing the synergism of the new 
economic governance, this interconnectedness also highlights the willingness to 
sacrifice legality to efficiency. The ECJ is tasked with overseeing adherence to the 
balanced budget rule, even imposing a lump-sum or penalty payments not exceeding 
0.1% of the State’s GDP.56 The TSCG limits the “structural deficit” to 0,5% of the 
GDP (par.2(b)) without mentioning how to operationalize this structural deficit 
concept, which presupposes the elimination of cyclical effects i.e. a determination 
of an economy’s normal capacity. Theoretically, structural deficit represents a gap 
between a country’s actual and potential output, i.e. output it would have if all of its 
resources were actively employed.57 The part of the deficit caused by business cycle 
fluctuations (“cyclical deficit”) is, therefore, not taken into account. The problem is, 
“the way the potential output [of an economy] is established provides a significant 
entry point for discretionary choices… [T]he concept of ‘structural balance’ is ‘not 
observable’, and…depends on estimations, which ‘implies difficulties, uncertainties 
and controversies”.58 It follows that enshrining such a malleable and controversial 
concept “preferably” in constitutional provisions demonstrates ignorance or even 
contempt of the role national constitutions play in codifying social morality.
4. ROLE OF EU BODIES IN THE NEW ECONOMIC 
GOVERNANCE
4.1. “Emergency” discourse 
While there are a number of earlier international treaties concluded between 
discreet groups of Member States (e.g. the Schengen regime), such practice has 
declined in the course of the evolution of European integration.59 “Coalitions of the 
willing” supplementing the Treaty framework should be a matter of last resort, since 
even if they do not contradict EU norms their existence implies the breakdown of 
the regular decision-making process and the bond of mutual trust between States.60 
This is especially salient in the present context, imbued with an understanding that 
compliance with the letter of the law would cause more harm than its breach.61
The most recent crisis resulted in a proliferation of decision-taking by 
56  Article 8(2) TSCG. Damian Chalmers objects to making the ECJ „an active agent of EU 
executive government. The Court is now so enmeshed with the regular policy-making of the 
EU as to lose much of its original purpose“ – The European Court of Justice is not little more 
than a rubber stamp for the EU, LSE blog, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/03/08/
ecj-rubber-stamp-replacement/>, 8 March 2012. 
57  Darvas, Z., Mind the gap! And the way structural budget balances are calculated, Bruegel, 
<http://bruegel.org/2013/10/mind-the-gap-and-the-way-structural-budget-balances-are-
calculated/>, 18 October 2013.
58  loc. cit.
59  De Witte, B., op. cit., p. 2.
60  White, J., Authority After Emergency Rule, Modern Law Review, vol. 78, 4/2015, p. 601.
61  Everson, M.; Joerges, C., op. cit., p. 23.
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supranational and national executives.62 A troubling feature of this rise of 
intergovernmentalism is the centrality of emergency discourse that legitimizes a 
shift of governance from a normative type to one “clearly and explicitly exercising 
hands-on executive power even in such sensitive fields as national budgets and 
macro-economic decisions”.63 A mere citing of crisis conditions seems to be enough 
of a justification for executive discretion - “[e]xceptionalism and improvisation 
have been widespread” as necessary responses to an urgent situation.64 Such 
emergency rule poses a number of problems, such as the danger that the temporary, 
urgently scrambled-together measures acquire lasting legitimacy65, and also that its 
casualties could include fundamental principles and the institutional patterns that 
channel them.66 One of those principles, equality of states, is pressured by the “Six-
pack’s” introduction of the reverse qualified majority voting (RQMV) whereby the 
Commission’s recommendation of sanctions proceeds unless blocked by a qualified 
majority of Member States in the Council. Sanctions can thus proceed only upon 
approval by the large “core” countries (France and Germany), and the Commission’s 
powers of initiation are increased.67 Also infringed is state sovereignty, pressured 
by the use of conditionality that compromises the nationalized nature of decision-
making on taxation and welfare spending. Democratic control is also skirted on the 
level of the EU proper, where the role of the European Parliament is informational 
and consultative at best under the ESM and TSCG.68
62  Curtin, D., op. cit., p. 2.
63  ibid., p. 6, noticing a shift from „economic governance“ (rules-based normative system) 
towards „economic government“ (discretionary executive decisions).
64  White, J., op. cit., p. 586.
65  loc. cit.
66  ibid., p. 587. The use of crisis to rewrite the terms of the political order (ibid., p. 604) is 
criticized by a number of national political movements.
67  The automatism described puts „power totally in the hands of the experts“ – Christine 
Lagarde’s 2010 remarks (as the then French Finance Minister) in France, Germany clash 
over austerity measures, Sydney Morning Herald, <http://www.smh.com.au/world/france-
germany-clash-over-austerity-measures-20100928-15vrx.html?deviceType=text>, 29 
September 2010.
68  In general, see Fasone, C., European Economic Governance and the Parliamentary 
Representation: What Place for the European Parliament?, European Law Journal, vol. 20, 
2/2014, p. 164: „the risk within EU economic governance is that fiscal austerity is put in 
place and pursued…by an authority which is lacking in representative credentials according 
to democratic standards” and by “marginalising the institutions which directly represent 
the citizens affected by these policies, to wit the EP and the national parliaments“ (p. 185). 
National parliaments are structurally outsiders in these processes. Secret meetings behind 
closed doors, with no public debate, make effective parliamentary input and control difficult 
(Curtin, D., op. cit., p. 17), and the role of parliaments may be thus eviscerated (ibid., p. 24).
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4.2. Participation in the enforcement of crisis-fueled intergovernmental  
 agreements
4.2.1. The role of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
The conclusion that Member States are free to make intergovernmental 
agreements under private and international law that are calibrated towards crisis 
resolution has another worrying consequence – it largely shields their operation 
from the scope of the Charter. Regardless of the necessity of congruence of ESM-
Member State agreements with EU law, the telos of Article 125’s imposition of 
strict conditionality is tied only to the economic dimension, that of policing an 
incentive to sound budgetary policy. Inasmuch as the Charter’s provisions are 
binding on Member States only when “implementing EU law” (Article 51(1) CFR), 
and as the set-up of the ESM is not mandated by a rule of EU law (or specifically 
stipulated as the Union’s competence), MoUs adopted within the ESM framework 
are immune against the Charter’s application (Pringle, paras.178-180).69 It is still 
formally applicable to the participating EU institutions70 - however, “assigning 
blame” to an EU institution may prove particularly problematic, seeing as it may 
not be the formal decision-maker, and/or the responsibility may be shared with 
Member States.71 
The question is: will the ECJ hold EU institutions to Charter’s standards? 
So far, it has declined to address this issue in the small number of cases it was 
seized with.72 It has also abdicated jurisdiction to review national measures adopted 
pursuant to an EFSF/EFSM MoU73, citing a lack of link to EU law despite the 
existence of a Council Decision that implemented the contents of the MoU. It held 
that “it should be recalled that…the provisions [of the Charter] are addressed to 
‘the Member States only when they are implementing Union law’ [and]…there is 
no specific evidence to consider that the law [in question, implementing the MoU] 
69  „For similar reasons it could be argued that the conclusion of the TSCG did not infringe the 
Charter“ –Barnard, C., The Charter, The Court – and the Crisis, Cambridge, University of 
Cambridge Research Paper 18/2013, August 2013, p. 12. „However, the TSCG is different 
from the ESM because…the content of the fiscal compact part of the TSCG largely overlaps 
with the content of the ‘six pack’ rules…Further, the link with the EU Treaties is much 
stronger (especially bearing in mind the commitment in Article 16 of incorporating the 
substance of the TSCG into the legal framework of the Union)“ – loc. cit. This suggests that 
acts taken under the TSCG need to be read subject to the Charter – „which they would be if 
they were taken under the six pack which is part of EU law“ – loc. cit.
70  Pringle, Opinion of AG Kokott, par.176. 
71  Craig, P., Pringle and Use…, cit., p. 28.
72  Hinarejos, A., The Euro Area…, cit., p. 133.
73  The following references for preliminary ruling were all made by the Portuguese courts 
(Labor Tribunals of Porto and Lisbon): C-128/12 Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte and 
Others v BPN - Banco Português de Negócios SA of 7 March 2013, C-264/12 Sindicato 
Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins v Fidelidade Mundial — Companhia de 
Seguros SA of 26 June 2014, and C-665/13 Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e 
Afins v Via Directa - Companhia de Seguros SA od 21 October 2014.
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aims to implement the EU law”.74 The reforms which a Member States undertakes 
as a condition for financial assistance are considered to be voluntary, since they 
are not tied to a binding obligation mandated by EU law.75 This “suggests a twin-
track approach: on the one hand the Charter will be applied with vigor to non-crisis 
situations; on the other, the Charter will not be applied to rules arising out of the 
EU’s response to the financial and economic crisis”.76 Such an approach is “not 
legally, politically or practically sustainable”77, avoiding a contextualization of its 
role along with a (necessarily!) synthetic reading of the totality of euro-crisis law. 
The Court’s actions are inconsistent, given its willingness to extensively interpret 
the scope of EU law when it should prove favorable for the Union.78 While the cited 
case-law relates specifically to the EFSM/EFSF conditionality, the link with EU law 
is even more apparent regarding the ESM and the application of the “Two-pack”, 
where such emergency-discourse hastened eschewing of judicial responsibility 
cannot be sufficient.79 The draft MEAP approved by the Council and then inserted in 
the MoU, synthetically linking ESM’s activities with those of the EU, should have 
to comply with provisions of the Charter. 
ESM conditionality was most recently taken to court in Cypriot bank-bailout 
appeal cases in 2016, where the applicants challenged the validity of a MoU. In 
Ledra Advertising80 and Mallis81, the ECJ reiterated that ESM acts fall outside the 
scope of EU law (Ledra Advertising, paras.53-54). But, the involvement of the 
Commission and the ECB in the adoption of the MoU may be unlawful and give 
rise to EU’s non-contractual liability for damages (par.55) if the breach of rule of 
74  Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte, paras. 11-12. The Court did not distinguish its reasoning 
in this case, where the Council Decision implementing the MoU was adopted after the 
specific national measures at stake, and the one in cases C-264/12 and C-665/13 (which were 
different in that regard).
75  Hinarejos, A., The Euro Area…, cit., p. 134.
76  Barnard, C., op. cit., p. 2.
77  loc. cit.
78  Hinarejos, A., The Euro Area…, cit., p. 135, referring to the case C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans 
Åkerberg Fransson of 26 February 2013, where the Court re-interpreted Article 51 of the 
Charter as mandating its application where Member States act „in the scope of Union law“, 
rather than when „implementing“ it (paras. 19-22).
79  Hinarejos, A., loc. cit. – while the link between MoUs and EU law was that essential contents 
of MoUs were mostly adopted within Council Decisions under Arts. 126 and 136 TFEU, 
the “Two-pack” made it more explicit. It created an obligation for the Member State asking 
for financial assistance to adopt a MEAP in agreement with the Commission, which is 
then adopted by the Council. The Commission, furthermore, ensures that the MoU is fully 
consistent with the MEAP.
80  Joined cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P (Ledra Advertising, Andreas Eleftheriou, Eleni 
Eleftheriou, Lilia Papachristofi, Christos Theophilou and Eleni Theophilou v. European 
Commission and ECB), of 20 September 2016.
81  Joined cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P (Konstantinos Mallis, Elli Konstantinou Malli, Tameio 
Pronoias Prosopikou Trapezis Kyprou, Petros Chatzithoma, Elenitsa Chatzithoma, Lella 
Chatziioannou and Marinos Nikolaou v. European Commission and ECB), of 20 September 
2016.
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law (unlawfulness of the act in question) is sufficiently serious (par.65).82 As the 
Commission is the “guardian of the Treaties”, it cannot support/sign an act that 
doesn’t conform to EU law.83 At least some Charter provisions within the ESM 
framework could potentially give rise to damages liability – social security and 
many welfare claims fall within the scope of the right to property according to the 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.84 This is of particular interest, 
as the adjustment programs rest “upon draconian austerity measures…[that entail] 
drastic reductions to social expenditure”.85
4.2.2. “Loaning” EU institutions
The governance system of the ESM forms a “curious hybrid”86: decision-
making powers are entrusted to organs composed of representatives of the Members, 
who happen to be the same persons who represent their country in the EU’s Euro 
Group and its Working Group. EU institutions like the Commission and the ECB 
are given a prominent role in preparing and implementing those (intergovernmental) 
decisions87, while disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the 
(intergovernmental) ESM Treaty are submitted to the ECJ (as authorized by Article 
273 TFEU, recital 16). Representatives of the European Commission, President of 
the ECB and the President of the Euro Group may participate in the meetings of the 
Board of Governors of the ESM as observers (Article 5). The Board of Governors 
tasks the Commission with negotiating, in liaison with the ECB, the economic 
policy conditionality attached to financial assistance (Art. 5(6(g))). It is clear that 
the Commission and the ECB play the role of agents of the ESM, preparing its 
operations and overseeing their implementation.
While tasking the ECJ finds an explicit base in the TFEU, rationalization 
regarding the Commission and the ECB is not so linear. In Pringle the ECJ 
confirmed that the Member States are clearly entitled to “entrust tasks to the 
institutions, outside the framework of the Union”, provided that those tasks do 
not alter the “essential character of the powers conferred on those institutions” by 
the TEU/TFEU (par.158). This formulation carries a number of problems from a 
constitutionalist standpoint. The first is a case of a failed analogy – such loaning of 
EU institutions was originally allowed in cases of non-exclusive Union competence 
82  This much welcome addition to the Court’s case-law was prematurely hailed as „the end 
of impunity“ –Dermine, P., ESM and Protection of Fundamental Rights, Verfassungsblog, 
<http://verfassungsblog.de/tag/ledra-advertising/, 21 September 2016. 
83  This is compounded by – but not limited to! – the fact that the ESMT explicitly obliges the 
Commission to ensure that the MoUs concluded by the ESM are consistent with EU law – 
Ledra Advertising, par. 58.
84  Hinarejos, A., Bailouts, Borrowed Institutions, and Judicial Review: Ledra Advertising, 
EULaw Analysis, <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.hr/2016/09/bailouts-borrowed-institutions-
and.html>, 25 September 2016. 
85  Costamagna, F., op. cit., p. 5.
86  De Witte, B., op. cit., p. 7.
87  loc. cit.
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where Member States decided to act outside the framework of the Treaties, 
because the “foundational imperative was that Member States acted in their field of 
competence, but found it useful to ask the Commission for help”.88 However, with 
the ESM Treaty is “the implicit legal metaphor…is governance and survival: the 
EU institutions had to be involved”.89 The second problem is that the “differentiated 
integration” treaty must only not entrust tasks which alter the essential character of 
powers conferred on the Commission and ECB by the Treaties. There are no formal 
legal requirements regarding this process – no obligation of adopting a reasoned 
justification for action, no particular form of the institution’s decision, no mandatory 
consultation with other actors or agreement of other institutions.90 We can observe 
an unsettling shift in allegiances – when the Commission “invests heavily” in 
an external treaty, this makes for a very strong influence on the way it designs 
subsequent proposals for EU legislation.91 Whether the new tasks alter the essential 
powers of the institution or not will also depend on the degree of broadness with 
which that character would be judicially construed92 (cf. Pringle, par.163).
The initial assumption might have been that ECB’s technical expertise 
serves as a complement to that of the Commission, and that it could support it in 
negotiating and monitoring the implementation of various EU/IMF programs. 
Virtually all financial assistance facilities since the start of the crisis has set out 
a role for the ECB.93 However, ECB’s participation in this regard is not clearly 
defined, hiding behind an oblique “in liaison with” formula. Indeed, “Reasons for 
European authorities to request ECB participation in the Troika are not spelled 
out, and there is no straightforward rationale for this involvement”.94 In the ordo-
liberal conception of the EMU, monetary policy is a non-political field pursued 
by independent experts unconcerned by issues of democratic legitimacy.95 Fiscal 
88  Craig, P., Pringle and Use…, cit., pp. 7-8.
89  ibid., p. 8.
90  ibid., p. 10. Decisions on the part of „loaned“ EU institutions to participate in an 
asymmetrically-concluded treaty may not be binding on the Union, but they’re still integral 
to the EU as a whole – 12. As to the issue of authorization by non-participating Member 
States, on 20 June 2011 the representatives of the 27 governments authorized the Contracting 
Parties of the ESMT to request the Commission and ECB to perform the tasks provided for 
in that Treaty – De Witte, B., op. cit., p. 19. Tuori notes the legal insignificance of this: “EU 
legislative procedures aim not only at guaranteeing the influence of all Member States but 
also the democratic input of the European Parliament and, after Lisbon, national parliaments 
as well” – Tuori, K., The European…, cit., pp. 36-37.
91  Craig, P., Pringle and Use…, cit., pp. 15-16.
92  ibid., p. 22.
93  Athanassiou, P., The ECB’s Discretionary Powers and Role in the Sovereign Debt Crisis: An 
Overview, London, King’s College, 11 March 2016, p. 9 (presentation available at <https://
www.kcl.ac.uk/law/research/centres/european/Binder1---all-papers.pdf>, starting at p. 48).
94  Pisani-Ferry, J.; Sapir, A.; Wolff, G., EU-IMF assistance to euro-area countries: an early 
assessment, Bruegel, <http://bruegel.org/2013/06/eu-imf-assistance-to-euro-area-countries-
an-early-assessment/>, 16 June 2013, p. 24.
95  „Not only has monetary policy no need of continuously produced democratic legitimacy but 
subordinating the ECB to the whims of democratic politics would be disastrous“ – Tuori, K., 
The European…, cit., p. 8.
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policy, on the other hand, rests on a particular redistributive justice paradigm, 
and must receive democratic input legitimacy provided by national political 
fora.96 Involvement of an expert and technocratic body such as the ECB in the 
implementation of extra-Treaty intergovernmental frameworks runs the risk of 
conflating the two policies in a hard-to-distinguish manner. As an institution 
relying on output legitimacy97, the ECB is „politically and socially ‘disembedded’“, 
operating in a political and social vacuum.98 It doesn’t interact with a (non-existent) 
European government or public opinion. Different democratic countries have found 
different solutions for this problem, but they all include a crucial role for public 
opinion and communication between such non-majoritarian, and democratically 
legitimated institutions. National central banks do not operate in vacuum, and are 
embedded in national debates which make them at least somewhat accountable to 
public opinion.99 But in the case of the ECB, the lack of democratic control does 
nothing to encourage self-restraint100. In his Opinion in Gauweiler101, AG Villalón 
agrees with the claim that the ECB’s dual role in the never-activated OMT program 
(see infra) compromises its limitations under the Treaty (paras.142 and 151). Seeing 
as the Treaties do not provide for criteria for the delimitation between monetary 
and economic policy, ECB’s competences should be narrowly interpreted due to 
democratic problem inherent in the ECB’s independent status.102 That means that 
in no scenario should it be possible for ECB officials to blackmail a President into 
96  Tuori notices that the non-political character of monetary policy suffered a severe blow 
during the crisis, as the relationship between the monetary and national fiscal policy shifted: 
the needs of the latter now determine the former – Tuori, K., European Constitutionalism, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 196. On the other hand, “a contrary 
tendency of de-politicization is perceivable in fiscal – and even macro-economic policy.” 
– id., The European…, cit., p. 45. Efforts to tighten fiscal discipline have diminished 
Member States’ fiscal policy sovereignty, as they were forced (through various provisions 
of the TSCG, “Six-pack” and “Two-pack”) to conform their national budget procedures to 
European requirements. Constitutionalized balanced budget requirement, excessive deficit 
and imbalance procedures, annual budget planning overseen by the Commission within the 
European Semester etc., fly in the face of the need for democratic legitimacy of fiscal policy 
– loc. cit.
97 ‘Input’ considerations relate to the democratic character of the decision procedure, and in 
particular the right of all citizens to participate on an equal basis in political decision-making. 
By contrast, ‘output’ considerations relate to the degree to which the substance of the decision 
may be said to promote collective interests in a manner compatible with the democratic goals 
of equal concern and respect” – Bellamy, R., Democracy without democracy? Can the EU’s 
democratic “outputs” be separated from the democratic “inputs” provided by competitive 
parties and majority rule?, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 17, 1/2012, p. 3.
98  Majone, G., Rethinking European Integration After the Debt Crisis, London, University 
College, European Institute, Working Paper No. 3/2012, June 2012, p. 14
99  Bellamy, R., op. cit., p. 11.
100  Majone, G., op. cit., p. 17.
101  Case C-62/14 Peter Gauweiler and others v. Deutscher Bundestag, opinion delivered on 14 
January 2015.
102 Schmidt, R., Die entfesselte EZB, Juristenzeitung, vol. 70, 2015, as referred to (disapprovingly) 
by Sauer, H., op. cit., p. 976.
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resigning103, or to explicitly threaten a sovereign state with default should it not 
comply with its instructions.104 
4.3. ECB to the rescue – creative monetary policy, or ultra vires actions?
After the lid was blown on the severe situation in Greece in October 2009, 
doubts grew over the stability of public finances in some euro area countries 
and the spreads between government bond yields across the Continent rose 
sharply. Sovereign markets became highly fragmented, fueled by (nervous) 
market perceptions about the viability of some countries’ fiscal balances, and 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism was impaired.105 ECB had to try to 
resolve these problems, preserving price stability through (euphemistically called) 
“unconventional monetary policies”.106 Joining the bandwagon of conditionality-
legitimizing-actions-beyond-the-meaning-and-scope-of-the-Treaty, it quoted “strict 
and effective conditionality” (attached to an EFSF/ESM program) of its (never 
implemented) OMT program107 and its later Quantitative Easing (QE) policy.108
4.3.1. OMT and Gauweiler – continuation of monetary policy by other means
The ECB has certainly resorted to highly unusual instruments of monetary 
policy anent the euro-crisis. Conventional monetary policy has not been able to 
“mop up” in the aftermath of the financial crisis and stimulate the economy into 
103  Land, C., The Eurozone Crisis and the European Central Bank’s Lost Independence, 
Minnesota Journal of International Law, vol. 25, 2/2016, p. 507, citing accounts by Lorenzo 
Bini Smaghi (former member of the ECB Executive Board) and Timothy Geithner (former 
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury).
104  ibid., p. 509.
105  The Determinants of Euro Area Sovereign Bond Yield Spreads During the Crisis, ECB 
Monthly Bulletin, May 2014, p. 67.
106  loc. cit. The ECB had to intervene in order to reduce the bond yield spreads, whose acute 
divergence between „peripheral“ euro countries and Germany made it not only increasingly 
difficult for the former to finance their public deficits, but also triggered a flight of investors to 
safety, namely the latter. The ensuing unavailability of funds (or their prohibitively high cost) 
would (in the long run) cause possible pressures on their national central banks to increase 
liquidity by entering into a primary emission. In the short run, the high cost of borrowing 
meant that countries with high budget deficits entered into a vicious circle where they issued 
more bonds (at high cost) just to cover repayment of the older ones. Such unproductive use 
of funds – which are not being used to stimulate production via investments etc. – inevitably 
causes inflation, pressuring price stability and the uniform transmission of the ECB’s 
monetary policy.
107  See Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), ECB press release, 6 
September 2012. 
108  Decision (EU) 2015/774 of the ECB on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase 
programme, ECB/2015/10, 4 March 2015. 
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recovery.109 Colloquially called “Draghi’s bazooka”110, the OMT was designed 
to remedy central shortcomings of the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) 
– namely, its limited size.111 In a speech given on 26 July 2012 in London, the 
President of the ECB Mario Draghi announced it “is ready to do whatever it takes 
to preserve the euro”, adding “believe me, it will be enough”.112 On 6 September 
2012, the Governing Council of the ECB announced its decision on a number of 
technical features of the OMT113: purchase of euro-zone countries’ short-term 
bonds (with maturity between 1 and 3 years) in the secondary market, conditioned 
by the existence of a EFSF/ESM program or macroeconomic adjustment program 
unrelated to those institutions, without any ex ante quantitative limits. The excess 
liquidity would be “fully sterilised”, perpetuating the template introduced with the 
SMP. 
Even if it was never activated, the OMT program triggered a major challenge 
to the “constitutionality” (vis-à-vis the Lisbon Treaty) of ECB’s actions. ECJ’s 
OMT decision in the Gauweiler case is considered to be “the most important 
decision on the role of the ECB”114 in the governing of the euro-crisis – not least 
109  Joyce, M. and others, Quantitative Easing and Unconventional Monetary Policy – an 
Introduction, The Economic Journal, vol. 122, 2012, p. 272.
110  Steen, M.; Fontanella-Khan, J.; Stothard, M., ECB signals resolve to save euro, The Financial 
Times, <https://www.ft.com/content/b70ff9a8-f84c-11e1-b0e1-00144feabdc0>, 6 September 
2012.
111  On 10 May 2010, the central banks of the Eurosystem started purchasing securities in the 
context of the SMP – a program to purchase bonds (especially sovereign bonds) on the 
secondary markets. Its aim was to counteract disruptions in the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, and at its peak its (overall – from 2010 to 2012) volume totaled around €210 
billion (Blackstone, B., Bundesbank would favor end of ECB sterilization – Source, Dow 
Jones Newsletters, <http://new.dowjones.com/newsletter/bundesbank-favor-end-ecb-
sterilization-source/>, 31 January 2014). Following a Governing Council decision on 6 
September 2012 to initiate the OMT, the SMP was terminated. The existing securities in the 
SMP portfolio were to be held to maturity. Sterilization (re-absorbing of liquidity provided by 
the SMP via weekly operations that include offers of interest-bearing deposits to banks in the 
amount corresponding to liquidity injected) was suspended by the ECB’s decision of 5 June 
2014 (the last operation was allotted on 10 June 2014) - https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/
implement/omt/html/index.en.html. This date coincides with the ECB’s introduction of the 
negative interest rate on the deposit facility at -0.1% on 11 June 2014 (the last update of this 
key interest rate was on 16 March 2016, setting it at a historical low of -0.4% - https://www.
ecb.europa.eu/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html). 2014 also saw increased discussions 
about the extent to which there is a risk of deflation in the euro area, given that the overall 
annual inflation in that area has declined from 3% in November 2011 to just 0.5% in May 
2014. On that basis, the IMF estimated the risk of deflation in the euro area by the end of 
2014 to be at 20% - Economic and Monetary Developments, ECB Monthly Bulletin, June 
2014, p. 65.
112  Speech made at the Global Investment Conference in London, <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/
press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html>. 
113  See supra, note 107.
114  Goldoni, M., The Limits of Legal Accountability of the European Central Bank, University 
of Glasgow, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2712240>, 7 January 
2016, p. 9.
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due to its origin in the first ever reference for a preliminary ruling by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court.115 The interaction of the ECJ and BVerfGE in that case 
underlined the profound constitutional nature of the dispute, with the latter court 
questioning: (1) whether the ECB’s OMT Decision exceeds the Bank’s monetary 
policy mandate116 regarding its conditionality117, selectivity (purchase of bonds only 
of selected States), parallelism (with programs of the EFSF/ESM) and bypassing of 
the EFSF/ESM’s programs’ conditions and terms; and (2) whether it is incompatible 
with the prohibition of monetary financing, seeing as it doesn’t provide for 
quantitative limits or a time lag between the bonds’ emission and purchase through 
OMTs (influencing pricing), allows for bonds to be held to maturity, and contains 
no requirements for the credit rating of the bonds purchased (default risk). The 
BVerfGE drew upon its case-law enabling it to review acts of European institutions 
and agencies that are based on manifest transgressions of powers (ultra vires acts and 
the “Honeywell doctrine”118) or affect an area of constitutional identity119 (regarding 
the principle of the overall budgetary responsibility of the Bundestag – par. 28).120 
115  Order of the Second Senate, 2 BvR 2728/13, 2 BvR 2729/2013, 2 BvR 2730/13, 2 BvR 
2731/13 and 2 BvE 13/13 of 14 January 2013, suspending proceedings and referring two 
questions for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Art. 367 TFEU. 
116  Interfering with the responsibility of the Member States for economic policy – par. 39. The 
Union’s competences in that area are limited to a coordination of Member States’ economic 
policies. The ECB may only support their general economic policies, not pursue its own 
(ibid.).
117 Linking the OMT to assistance measures of significant financial scope and general political 
implication that belong to the core aspects of the Member States’ economic policy 
responsibilities (par. 40). Tying the purchase of government bonds of selected Member States 
to full compliance with the requirements of the assistance programs of the EFSF/ESM, the 
ECB makes the purchase an instrument of economic policy. This is confirmed by the fact 
that OMTs would not be carried out unless the program conditionality is fully respected (par. 
77). OMTs then become functional equivalents to an assistance measure of those institutions, 
without parliamentary legitimation and monitoring (par. 78).
118  BVerfGE, 126, 286: „Ultra vires review may only be exercised in a manner which is friendly 
towards European law…The Union…is in particular bound by the principle of conferral 
and by fundamental rights, and it respects the constitutional identity of Member States…[T]
the Federal Constitutional Court must in principle comply with the rulings of the Court of 
Justice” which is “to be afforded the opportunity to interpret the Treaties, as well as to rule on 
the validity and interpretation of the legal acts in question, in the context of preliminary ruling 
proceedings“. Ultra vires review may be considered only is the transgression of powers is (a) 
manifest; (b) specifically violating the principle of conferral; making the breach of powers 
(c) sufficiently qualified and (d) highly significant for the allocation of powers between the 
Member States and the Union (paras. 303-304).
119  Review cannot be waived with regard to the „eternity clause“ of Art. 79(3) of the 
Grundgesetz. Germany is one of the „masters of the Treaties“, making the primacy/priority of 
Union law non-comprehensive in this regard (Gauweiler order, 26).
120  “Bundestag may not consent to an automatism of bonds or benefits that are agreed upon 
intergovernmentally or supranationally and that is not subject to strict specifications and 
whose effects are not limited, and which – once it has been set in motion – is removed from 
the Bundestag’s control and influence“ (citing BVerfGE 129, 124). The OMT decision could 
violate the constitutional identity of Germany if it created a mechanism which would amount 
713
A. HORVAT VUKOVIĆ, Rule of Law and Economic Exigency...
Zb. Prav. fak. Sveuč. Rij. (1991) v. 38, br. 2, 693-727 (2017) 
Moreover, it stressed the incompatibility of this protection of German constitutional 
identity (which is not subject to balancing in the matrix of proportionality analysis) 
with the guarantee of “national identity” in Article 4(2) TEU (which is). There is 
no legitimate aim capable of compromising the “inviolable core content” of the 
Grundgesetz (paras. 27 and 29). The reference is framed in conclusive terms, stating 
that the “applications would probably be successful”, unless the OMT Decision 
were interpreted “in conformity with primary law” (55).121 Where there is a blurring 
of the lines between monetary policy (competence of the ECB) and “just” economic 
policy (a province of the States), it is the duty of the ECJ to delineate these two, and 
determine the scope and content of the ECB’s mandate - the Court’s inaptness in 
economic sciences notwithstanding (par.60). While the Court in Pringle stressed the 
objectives of a policy, it is important to review the instruments used, as well as their 
link to other provisions (paras.64-65). 
In our view, it is this last feature of a program which is most indicative of its 
nature, as it illuminates the ratio behind its nominal objectives. The BVerfGE states 
that “references…to other provisions and the embedding of an act in an overall 
regulation that consists of several individual measures can indicate its adherence 
either to the economic or monetary policy” (par.66). We must “pierce the veil” in 
the sense of reviewing the amalgamated picture of individually legal instruments, 
reassessing their constitutionality in this synoptic view of mutually intertwined 
mechanisms. In doing so, we must notice the convenient parallelism between 
Pringle and Gauweiler, with the first confirming ESM’s constitutionality on the 
grounds that it was a measure of economic policy with tangential monetary policy 
implications, and the latter approved the OMT as a program within the ECB’s 
monetary policy mandate with tangential economic policy implications (52).122 
As the OMT’s conditionality tethers it firmly to ESM’s activities, one cannot but 
conclude that it represents an extension of economic policy cloaked by monetary 
policy justifications, transgressing the ECB’s mandate under the Treaties. It’s a pity 
to an assumption of liability for decisions of third parties which entail consequences that are 
difficult to calculate (par.102).
121  The reference is „not formulated in terms of a dialogue between Courts, each respecting the 
other’s distinctive powers. Instead, the BVerfG…asks the CJEU essentially to confirm“ its 
interpretation, with a „thinly veiled threat“ to unilaterally hold an act of an EU institution 
to be invalid within Germany – Hofmann, H., Gauweiler and OMT: Lessons for EU Public 
Law and the European Economic and Monetary Union, University of Luxembourg, Working 
Paper, 19 June 2015, p. 1.
122  “The delimitation of monetary…and economic policy…is viewed by the CJEU in Gauweiler 
as a question of primary versus secondary effects of a measure. In reality, the distinction 
mirrors older case law of the CJEU on the so called ‘centre of gravity’ rule which was applied 
in situations where a measure could have several competing legal basis each proposing a 
different decision making procedure. The Court informs that the fact that a measure in the 
field of the Union’s monetary policy might incidentally also have secondary effects ‘on the 
stability of the euro area’, which is a matter of economic policy, does not call that assessment 
into question” – ibid., p. 13.
714
A. HORVAT VUKOVIĆ, Rule of Law and Economic Exigency...
Zb. Prav. fak. Sveuč. Rij. (1991) v. 38, br. 2, 693-727 (2017) 
that the ECJ did not address AG Villalón’s opinion123 on the untenable character of 
the ECB’s dual role of (a) holder of a claim the basis for which is a government 
bond issued by a State, and (b) supervisor and negotiator of a financial assistance 
program applied to the same State. AG Villalón held that, in the event that the OMT 
program be activated, the ECB would be prevented from direct involvement in the 
financial assistance programs of the ESM or EFSF applied to the State concerned 
– if the OMT were to stay regarded as a monetary policy measure (paras.142 and 
150-151).124
The ECJ’s response on 16 June 2015 took upon face value ECB’s claim that 
the OMT is targeted (just) at “appropriate monetary policy transmission and the 
singleness of monetary policy” (par. 47 - an expansive and undefined objective, 
if there ever was one).125 From the economic-technical viewpoint, the decision is 
surprisingly devoid of a closer scrutiny of ECB’s claims and arguments. While 
acknowledging the ECJ’s judges’ lack of expertise in this regard, as well as 
the limited scope of the judiciary’s mandate (rulings on points of law, instead of 
technical, discretionary choices)126, we do believe that an assessment of legality of 
independent regulators’ activities necessitates a degree of examination stricter than 
mere rubberstamping. The Court reiterates its previous case-law where it held that 
an EU institution that enjoys broad discretion must give an “adequate” statement of 
reasons for its decision (par. 69), even if it needn’t go into every relevant point of 
fact and law (par. 70). In this case ECB’s information “doesn’t appear” to be vitiated 
by a “manifest error of assessment” (par. 74). The “least restrictive means” step 
of proportionality analysis is thus restated as “not manifestly unnecessary” means 
(par. 81)127 – in this regard, we cite the BVerfGE’s belief that “the independence 
123  Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v. Deutscher Bundestag, opinion delivered on 14 
January 2015.
124  Where a state is the recipient of substantial assistance from the ECB on the secondary 
government bond market, putting the ECB simultaneously in a position where it oversees 
the implementation of a financial assistance program that its OMTs are conditional upon 
compromises its purely monetary policy agenda (paras. 150-151). The Court, inversely, 
viewed adherence to program conditionality positively, as a means through which to avoid the 
risk of the launch of OMTs lessening the incentives of beneficiary Member States to follow 
a sound budgetary policy (Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v. Deutscher Bundestag, 16 
June 2015, par. 120).
125  „[T]he Court of Justice accepts the assertion that the OMT programme pursues a monetary 
policy objective without questioning or at least discussing and individually reviewing the 
soundness of the underlying factual assumptions, and without testing these assumptions 
with regard to the indications that evidently argue against a character of monetary policy“ – 
BVerfGE’s Gauweiler judgment on 21 June 2016, Press release (in English) No. 34/2016 of 
21 June 2016.
126  “This type of highly technical, very complex and information intensive activity is…very 
difficult to monitor through ‘traditional’ legal means of a framework of powers and judicial 
review” – Hofmann, H., op. cit., p. 16.
127  „Interestingly, the CJEU decides actively to reduce its level of review as compared to the 
AG who in par. 177 of his opinion refers to more onerous second-leg proportionality test by 
looking for whether ‘the means used may none the less be excessive if compared with the 
other options that would have been available to the ECB.’“ – ibid., p. 19.
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granted to the European Central Bank leads to a noticeable reduction in the level 
of democratic legitimation of its actions and should therefore give rise to restrictive 
interpretation and to particularly strict judicial review of the mandate of the 
European Central Bank”.128 
The ECJ does, however, concede that ESCB’s intervention “could, in practice, 
have an effect equivalent” to monetary financing “if the potential purchasers of 
government bonds on the primary market know for certain that the ESCB was going 
to purchase…within a certain period and under conditions allowing those market 
operators to act, de facto, as intermediaries for the ESCB for the direct purchase 
of those bonds” (par.104). Having the benefit of hindsight, we can conclude that 
the ECB’s activities since OMT’s announcement (with the introduction of an 
unsterilized PSPP and especially principal reinvestment policy – see infra) reduce 
this margin of uncertainty to a degree compromising ECJ’s conclusion. However, 
cornered by the Honeywell doctrine and its request of a manifest transgression of 
competences129, on 21 June 2016 the BVerfGE confirmed (with some conditions –
par. 206) its legality130.
4.3.2. “What’s in a name” – QE as primary financing in disguise
As a program entailing full sterilization of excess liquidity it created, the OMT 
was (just like the SMP) not amenable to being used as a price stabilization tool. The 
most high-profile form of unconventional monetary policy thus became QE. Under 
Art. 18(1) of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, the ECB and national central 
banks of euro-states may operate in the financial markets by buying and selling 
marketable instruments outright. On 22 January 2015, the Governing Council of the 
ECB decided that its existing Asset Purchases Programmes (APPs)131 be expanded 
128  loc. cit.
129  The BVerfGE found that the ECJ’s interpretation „barely passed muster“ – Lindseth, P., 
Meanwhile, in Germany…the OMT ruling of the German Constitutional Court, EUTopia 
Law, <https://eutopialaw.com/2016/06/23/meanwhile-in-germany-the-omt-ruling-of-the-
german-constitutional-court/>, 23 June 2016.
130  Judgment of the Second Senate of 21 June 2016, 2 BvR 2728/13. 
131  Consisting of a covered bond purchase programme (already in its third generation at the time 
of launch of QE in 2015 – hence termed CBPP3) and an asset-backed securities purchase 
programme (ABSPP), and aimed at „further enhancing the transmission of monetary policy, 
facilitating credit provision to the euro area economy, easing borrowing conditions of 
households and firms and contributing to returning inflation rates“ to about 2% - Decision 
(EU) 2015/774 of the ECB on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme 
(ECB/2015/10, 4 March 2015), 3rd recital. Aimed at debt securities issued by financial 
institutions (i.e. banks), CBPP was originally (CBPP1) launched by a Decision of the ECB 
of 2 July 2009 (ECB/2009/16), encouraging credit institutions to maintain and expand their 
lending to clients and improve market liquidity – Beirne, J. and others, The impact of the 
Eurosystem’s Covered Bond Purchase Programme on the Primary and Secondary Markets, 
ECB Occasional Paper Series, No. 122, January 2011, p. 5. The then President of the 
Governing Council of the ECB Trichet expressly denied that the CBPP was quantitative 
easing, as the excess liquidity created by APPs before PSPP and 2015 was sterilized – 
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to include secondary markets public sector debt securities, in order to mitigate the 
risk of developments jeopardizing maintenance of price stability (Public Sector 
Purchases Programme - PSPP).132 The purchasing program began on 2 April 2015, 
totaling €60 billion per month until March 2016. On 10 March 2016, the ECB 
announced that it would increase this amount to €80 billion until at least March 
2017 or until it sees inflation hit the target rate of 2% over the medium term.133 
It also expanded the eligible assets to include “euro-denominated bonds issued by 
non-bank corporations established in the euro area”, thus adding the Corporate 
Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) to the pre-existing APPs and PSPP.134 The 
figures for October 2016 show that, at the end of the month, Eurosystem holdings of 
marketable debt instruments came at €1391 billion (almost €1.4 trillion) of liquidity 
injected into the banking system.135 In January 2017, they already passed the €1.5 
trillion mark by €117 billion.136
Is this elaborate scheme constitutional, i.e. within the mandate of the TFEU? 
We posit that it is not, and that it shows “a willingness of the monetary authority 
[i.e. ECB] to selectively violate the Treaty provisions when it [is] ideologically 
consistent to do so”.137 The ECB has turned itself into a lender of last resort 
ECB Market Intervention: Covered Bond Purchasing Programme, Place du Luxembourg, 
<https://placeduluxembourg.wordpress.com/2012/02/22/ecb-market-intervention-covered-
bond-purchasing-programme-cbpp/>, 22 February 2012. Sterilization of those purchases 
(in order to limit their inflationary effects) was achieved by auctioning fixed term deposits 
on a weekly basis. This means that the immediate effect of the policy was calibrated only 
towards narrowing the bond yield spreads among euro-zone states, and not increasing market 
liquidity. This second aspect was introduced with the PSPP in 2015, ushering the “big QE” 
era as a natural extension of the “mini QE” represented by its decision in 2014 to stop 
sterilizing its purchases under the SMP – Mattich, A., 5 takeaways from the ECB’s moves on 
rates, The Wall Street Journal, <http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2014/06/05/5-takeaways-from-
the-ecbs-moves-on-rates/>, 5 June 2014.
132  Decision (EU) 2015/774 of the ECB of 4 March 2015 on a secondary markets public sector 
asset purchase programme (ECB/2015/10). Eligible for purchases are euro-denominated 
marketable debt securities issued by central governments of Member States whose currency 
is the euro, recognized agencies located in the euro area, and international organizations 
and multilateral development banks located in the euro area (Art. 3). Article 5 stipulates 
an aggregate purchase limit of 33% of an issuer’s outstanding securities (par.3). However, 
the number rises to 50% in case where the issuer is an eligible international organization 
or multilateral development bank – Decision (EU) 2016/702 of the ECB of 18 April 2016 
amending Decision (EU) 2015/774 (ECB/2016/8).
133  The annual euro-zone inflation rate has been continuously below 0.5% since September 2014, 
even diving below zero in January 2015.
134  Decision (EU) 2016/948 of the ECB on the implementation of the corporate sector purchase 
programme (ECB/2016/16 of 1 June 2016). Such an Expanded Asset Purchases Programme 
will be temporarily paused between 22 December and 30 December 2016, in anticipation of 
lower market liquidity during this period. Purchases will resume on 2 January 2017 - https://
www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html. 
135  Table showing Eurosystem holdings under the expanded asset purchase programme, <https://
www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html>.
136  loc. cit.
137  Mitchell, B., ECB – every which way but to the point, Bill Mitchell – billy blog, <http://bilbo.
economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=34706>, 2 November 2016. 
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against an explicit TFEU prohibition.138 Art. 123 TFEU constricts the ECB in the 
possibility of utilizing “helicopter money”139, i.e. in using monetary financing. This 
is due to historical inflation traumas of a number of Member States140, and bars 
it from purchasing government bonds in the primary market and thus increasing 
the monetary base.141 But, as the ECJ’s ruling in the OMT case has shown, there 
is considerable leeway since the ECB can purchase government bonds in the 
secondary markets, “ensur[ing] that there is a real opportunity…for a market price 
to form in respect of the government bonds concerned, in such a way that there 
continues to be a real difference between a purchase of bonds on the primary…
and…secondary market”.142 
The drawing of this line proves to be difficult, not least due to a stunning 
variability of ECB’s activities that defy the Treaty prohibition of monetary 
financing in non-orthodox ways. The PSPP proved very efficient in going praeter 
the monetary financing prohibition, allowing the ECB and national central banks 
to finance Member States’ government debt virtually interest-free. Article 6 of the 
Decision on the PSPP stipulates that “The NCBs’ share of the total market value of 
purchases of marketable debt securities eligible under PSPP shall be 90%, and the 
remaining 10% shall be purchased by the ECB. The distribution of purchases across 
jurisdictions shall be according to the key for subscription of the ECB’s capital”. 
Germany holds the greatest capital key of 17.9973%. France and Italy are following 
with 14.1792% and 12.3108%, with Spain at 8.8%. However, the data shows that 
the NBCs have been buying significantly more than is allowed – between March 
2015 and April 2016, Germany made 23.4%, France 18.6%, Italy 16.1% and Spain 
11.5% total purchases.143 The effects of such a policy are clear, given that the NCBs 
prevalently invest in bonds issued by their own home governments144: driving up 
demand lowers the yields (interest rates) on the bonds. Private bond investors – 
stimulated by a near-certainty of offloading the bonds to the ECB and NCBs – buy 
138  Natali, D.; Vanhercke, B., Social policy in the European Union: state of play, Brussels, 
European Trade Union Institute, 2015, p. 44.
139 Friedman, M., The Optimum Quantity of Money, Transaction Publishers, 2005, pp. 4-5 („the 
money from the sky seems like a bonanza, a true windfall gain“ – ibid., p. 14).
140 Helicopters 101: your guide to monetary financing, Deutsche Bank Research, Special Report, 
15 April 2016, p. 7.
141 „‘Monetary finance’ is defined as running a fiscal deficit (or a higher deficit than would 
otherwise be the case) which is not financed by the issue of interest-bearing debt, but by an 
increase in the monetary base – i.e. of the irredeemable fiat non-interest-bearing monetary 
liabilities of the government/central bank“ – Turner, A., The Case for Monetary Finance 
– An Essentially Political Issue, 16th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference, IMF, 
Washington, 5-6 November 2015, p. 2.
142  Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Gauweiler, par. 225.
143 Mitchell, B., ECB’s expanded asset purchase programme – more smoke and mirrors, Bill 
Mitchell – billy blog, <http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=33643>, 30 May 2016.
144 Ewing, J., Quiet Start to Central Bank Bond-Buying Program for the Eurozone, The New 
York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/business/international/ecb-bond-buying-
program-quantitative-easing.html?_r=0>, 9 March 2015.
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up the debt, at prices that reflect the rate expected to be acceptable to the ECB.145 
However, traditional Keynesian theory warns us that excess liquidity in itself cannot 
act as a counter-cyclical stimulus if uncoupled with an expansionary fiscal policy, 
stimulating demand and expanding production. The asset swap (bonds for increased 
reserves) does not automatically translate to bank lending, since it’s not the reserve 
(un)availability that keeps banks from lending – it’s the credit untrustworthiness 
of potential borrowers. At the same time, in conditions of high unemployment and 
general uncertainty borrowers are not stimulated by a mere drop in interest rates 
– unless it’s not accompanied with an increase of their borrowing power (through 
lowered income taxes and VAT, raised non-taxable minimum income, highly 
progressive tax system etc.). It is unsurprising that a senior economist at the ECB 
stated in October 2016 that “Despite this stimulus [i.e. QE], the euro area’s low 
level of investment might well appear disappointing”.146 Regarding the real impact 
of the QE, it hasn’t delivered on its promise to trigger inflation by inundating the 
markets with increased liquidity – even if there have been some positive changes in 
the inflation rate, recovering from a -0.6% in January 2015 to +1.1% in December 
2016.147
Interestingly, listed as one of the international organizations whose marketable 
debt instruments are purchasable through the PSPP is the European Stability 
Mechanism. It is difficult to belie the clear manipulation of the Treaty: 1) the 
ESCB may not legally engage in monetary financing, but it can 2) finance (through 
a purchase of bonds) an international organization (ESM) established in order to 
circumvent the Treaty, which can then 3) use such funds for facilities that may 
take the form of 4) purchase of a Member States’ bonds on the primary market. 
In addition, in December 2015 the ECB announced plans to reinvest payments on 
the securities purchased under the expanded APP as they mature, “for as long as 
necessary”.148 That means that the ECB intends to “maintain the degree of monetary 
145  Mitchell, B., ECB’s…, cit.
146  Vermeulen, P., The recovery of investment in the euro area in the aftermath of the great 
recession: how does it compare historically?, ECB, Research Bulletin No. 28, <http://www.
ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-research/resbull/2016/html/rb161028.en.html>, 28 October 
2016. 
147  Overall inflation rate by month (1996-2016), at: <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/prices/
hicp/html/inflation.en.html>. The main cause is to be found in its fundamentally flawed 
presumption that banks aren’t lending (and consumers aren’t taking out loans) because 
of a shortage of money. There is no straightforward answer to the question of why this 
“cheap” money isn’t converted into investments, due to the opaqueness of the transmission 
mechanism. Some proposals call for a switch to strategic QE that targets investments directly 
to the real economy, sidestepping the intermediaries (i.e. commercial banks). E.g., Varoufakis 
proposes that EIB’s bonds be the single asset the ECB is buying in the secondary markets, 
and that the EIB simultaneously embarks upon a large-scale, pan-euro-zone investment-led 
recovery program – Varoufakis, Y., A QE proposal for Europe’s crisis (Economists’ roundtable 
on the euro zone), The Economist, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2014/11/
economists-roundtable-euro-zone-3>, 7 November 2014.
148  Introductory statement to the press conference, Mario Draghi (President of the ECB) and 
Vitor Constâncio (Vice-President of the ECB), Frankfurt, 3 December 2015.
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accommodation…for a longer horizon” and that “conditions of quite abundant 
liquidity…will continue for a long, long time”.149 Coupled with a strong commitment 
to continue the PSPP until March 2017 and “further if necessary” (this “necessity” 
being all but a certainty at this point, and the semblance of restraint mere lip service 
to the cautious observers), this measure comes as close to monetary financing as 
it can without explicitly admitting to it.150 Namely, “acquisition of over a trillion 
euros of government bonds…is not strictly direct financing”, since it doesn’t per se 
raise the monetary base (as they are bought on secondary markets).151 However, a 
commitment to a principal reinvestment program intending to systematically keep 
investing in public-sector bonds distorts the market and effectively monetizes the 
debt “for the foreseeable future, which is exactly what monetary financing is”.152 
Extending Kipling’s famous adage to the present situation, it must be said that: if 
it looks and feels like monetary financing, and has the effect of monetary financing, 
it must be recognized as monetary financing. The Treaty prohibitions cannot be 
circumvented by functionally equivalent measures, their mimesis of constitutionality 
notwithstanding.
5. FINAL REMARKS
The most recent global financial crisis seriously damaged the financial 
stability of Member States, forcing a number of them to seek financial assistance. 
Its provision – both within and outside the Union – imposed strict conditionality on 
states receiving the aid and tight fiscal discipline rules on the rest of them. Austerity 
policies further deepened the crisis, transforming it from a sovereign debt problem 
to an ongoing recession on the EU level.153 
The choice of legal instruments designed to combat the crisis entailed a 
decision-making pattern that skirted the need for their democratic approval.154 
Adoption of an international treaty such as the ESM circumvented the EU Treaty-
149  ibid.
150  Paul, J., The ECB’s Covers Monetary Financing is Risky Business, Bloomberg View, 
<http://origin-www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-12-04/the-ecb-s-new-policy-sets-a-
dangerous-precedent>, 4 December 2015.
151  loc. cit.
152  loc. cit. Lurking in the background is also the problem of “unwinding” QE: selling the bonds 
would push down their prices and push up interest rates (bringing the problem back to square 
one). The European Parliament is among the many worrying about the timing and cost of 
such an endeavor – Delivorias, A., The ECB’s Quantitative Easing: Early results and possible 
risks, European Parliamentary Research Service, December 2015, pp. 5-6.
153  „[T]he imposition of austerity…was…to maintain the ideological hegemony of an 
intrinsically neo-liberal European Commission. The recession that followed was created by 
the austerity“ – Mitchell, B., ECB…, cit.
154  Armstrong, K., Responding to the Economic Crisis: Public Law in a Post-Lisbon Age, 
EUtopia Law, <https://eutopialaw.com/2012/02/21/responding-to-the-economic-crisis-public-
law-in-a-post-lisbon-age/>, 21 February 2012. 
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amending process. This preference for ad hoc arrangements may have been legal 
in form, but did not produce a comprehensive – or a substantively “constitutional” 
- legal framework. The abundance of options for rule-making had the effect of 
reinforcing executive discretion, and allowing frameworks to be sidestepped when 
they became inconvenient.155 The “Ersatzunionsrecht” – substitute EU law156 - 
facilitated a particular form of authoritarian crisis management157, establishing 
a political administration outside the realm of a democratic politics and the form 
of accountability which the rule of law demands.158 Intergovernmental stability 
mechanisms remain outside the scope of application of both Treaty provisions 
on the principle of transparency and complementary secondary legislation. Such 
an institutional development makes any control by the European parliament or 
national parliaments, not to mention civil society and the citizenry, extremely 
difficult”.159 Moreover, the Charter has “yet to bite in the most sensitive area of all 
– the consequences of the financial crisis. This failure is damaging to the long term 
legitimacy of the Union and undermines the Court’s oft-expressed commitment 
to human rights”.160 The Fiscal Compact is deeply problematic161 from a national 
constitutional perspective, constraining budgetary process and national parliaments’ 
discretion in this matter, as well as mandating constitutional amendments. Therefore, 
the new economic and fiscal governance instruments have faced widespread 
criticism for evading democratic control and accountability.162 We are witnessing a 
re-dedication of the EU federalist structure, this time to (in democratic terms more 
primitive) intergovernmentalism supported by epistocratic reliance on expertise-
based institutions such as the Commission and the ECB.163 This has rightly been 
termed executive federalism.164
155  White, J., op. cit., 597.
156  „Ersatz law“ being an oxymoron which indicates that instruments thus generated are not 
„law“ as we know it – de Búrca, G.; Kilpatrick, C.; Scott, J., Critical Legal Perspectives on 
Global Governance: Liber Amicorum David M. Trubek, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013, p. 
313.
157  Everson, M.; Joerges, C., op. cit., p. 11.
158  ibid., p. 13.
159  Tuori, K., The European…, cit., p. 47.
160  Barnard, C., op. cit., p. 16.
161  loc. cit.
162  Rittberger, B., Integration without Representation? The European Parliament and the Reform 
of Economic Governance in the EU, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 52, 6/2014, p. 
1174.
163  Epistocracy is a political regime that asks citizens to surrender their standards of judgment 
in favor of experts who are better placed than they to address the policy questions that affect 
their lives – Isiksel, T., Europe’s Functional Constitution: A Theory of Constitutionalism 
Beyond the State, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 221.
164  Tuori, K., The European…, cit., p. 46. Incrementalist reactions to the fiscal crisis produces 
a plethora of new official, semi-official and unofficial bodies – some with formal decision-
making powers, other without formal competence but still exercising considerable influence. 
The institutional and legal fragmentation hampers supervision by the European and national 
parliaments, as well as by civil society and the citizenry – loc. cit.
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Despite serving as the leitmotiv of the European response to the economic 
crisis, conditionality still represents a controversial instrument, whose legal nature 
has yet to be clearly defined.165 Not only is the economic constitution dictating the 
political agenda, it is also subordinating the social constitution. The temptation to 
rubberstamp this new austere economic paradigm due to fears of uncertainty of 
taking a different route must be resisted. Asking what would’ve happened if Pringle 
hadn’t confirmed ESM’s legality or if the banks were allowed to go bankrupt cannot 
authorize the courts to obediently approve the measures adopted. Pure citing of 
exigent circumstances implies an abdication of law. The goal must be to search 
for alternatives to a “devastating” legal default166, in line with European shared 
commitment to common values of democracy and rule of law. Even in exceptional 
circumstances, adoption of measures inconsistent with such values undermines the 
integrity of the Union legal order as a whole.167 We support the view that “’more 
Europe’ had come to mean more intergovernmental collaboration under Franco-
German hegemony…The Union has reverted to…elitist decision making”168 that 
puts considerable strain on its democratic legitimacy. (Austerity) orders barked 
from Olympian heights of executive politics exacerbate already weak growth 
and rising unemployment, and unwisely allow popular resentment to metastasize 
into populist movements across the Continent, feeding on citizens’ frustrations. 
De-fragmentation, abandonment of the “multi-speed Europe” idea169 (which 
is abortive to the European commitment to unity), a return to the foundational 
European federalist principles; these (intertwined with a dedication to continent-
wide solidarity and social welfare) seem to be necessary steps if the EU is to avoid 
compromising a shared dream irrevocably.
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VLADAVINA PRAVA I EKONOMSKA NUŽDA U “POST-
DEMOKRATSKOM IZVRŠNOM FEDERALIZMU”: NEKA 
USTAVNA PITANJA EURO-KRIZE
Autorica analizira odgovor Europske unije na još uvijek aktualnu ekonomsku 
krizu, usredotočujući se na problem zakonodavne i institucionalne fragmentacije. 
Tvrdi da autoritarno upravljanje krizom – poticano rječnikom „stanja nužde“ 
– podriva demokratsku odgovornost svojim oslanjanjem na izvršnu diskreciju 
i intergovernmentalizam. Kroz analizu jurisprudencije Suda Europske unije i 
uz pogled izbliza na točno funkcioniranje i implikacije ultra vires djelovanja 
Europske središnje banke, pokazuje kako je Lisabonski ugovor žrtvovan u ime 
nužde stvaranja Ersatz prava Unije, koje bolje odgovara neposrednim potrebama 
reformiranja Ekonomske i monetarne unije. Drži da su intergovernmentalni 
instrumenti ne samo “protuustavno” rekvirirali sudjelovanje institucija EU, već i da 
su naštetili legitimitetu Unije uspostavivši političku upravu netaknutu zahtjevima 
demokratske odgovornosti. Posljedično podčinjavanje političkog i socijalnog ustava 
onom ekonomskom dovodi do abdikacije prava i podrivanja integriteta pravnog 
poretka Unije.
Ključne riječi: EU, ekonomska kriza, vladavina prava, izvršni federalizam,  
 intergovernmentalizam. 
Zusammenfassung
RECHTSSTAATLICHKEIT UND WIRTSCHAFTLICHE DRING-
LICHKEIT IM POSTDEMOKRATISCHEN EXEKUTIV-FÖDER-
ALISMUS: EINIGE VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHE FRAGEN 
DER EURO-KRISE
Die Autorin analysiert die Antwort der Europäischen Union auf die noch 
immer aktuelle wirtschaftliche Krise, indem sie sich in der Arbeit auf das Problem 
der gesetzgebenden und institutionellen Fragmentierung fokussiert. Sie behauptet, 
dass das autoritäre Krisenmanagement, betrieben durch Notstand, die demokratische 
Verantwortlichkeit untergräbt, indem es sich auf den Ermessensspielraum 
der Exekutive und die Zwischenstaatlichkeit verlässt. Durch die Analyse der 
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Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs und genauere Betrachtung der 
Funktionierung und Implikationen von ultra vires Handlungen der Europäischen 
Zentralbank weist die Arbeit auf die Tatsache hin, dass der Vertrag von Lissabon 
für den Notstand der Herstellung des EU-Ersatzrechtes geopfert wurde, welches 
für sofortige Bedürfnisse der Reformierung von Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion 
geeignet ist. Die Autorin ist der Meinung, dass zwischenstaatliche Instrumente 
nicht nur „verfassungswidrig“ die Teilnahme von EU-Institutionen requiriert, 
sondern auch die Legitimität der Union geschädigt haben, indem sie die politische 
Verwaltung unempfänglich für Forderungen der demokratischen Verantwortlichkeit 
gemacht haben. Solche Unterwerfung der politischen und sozialen Verfassung unter 
die wirtschaftlichen Umstände führt zur Rechtsniederlegung und Untergrabung der 
Integrität der EU-Rechtsordnung. 
Schlüsselwörter: die EU, wirtschaftliche Krise, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Exekutiv- 
 Föderalismus, Zwischenstaatlichkeit.
Riassunto
LO STATO DI DIRITTO ED IL BISOGNO ECONOMICO NEL 
„FEDERALISMO ESECUTIVO POST-DEMOCRATICO “: 
ALCUNE QUESTIONI COSTITUZIONALI DELLA CRISI 
DELL’EURO
L’autrice analizza la risposta dell’Unione europea alla ancora attuale crisi 
economica, concentrandosi sulla questione della frammentazione legislativa ed 
istituzionale. Ritiene che la gestione autoritaria della crisi – stimolata dall’uso di 
termini quale „lo stato di bisogno“ – pregiudichi la responsabilità democratica, 
appoggiandosi sulla discrezione esecutiva e sull’intergovernalismo. Attraverso 
l’analisi della giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione europea ed 
osservando da vicino l’esatto funzionamento, ma anche l’operare ultra vires, della 
Banca Centrale europea, mostra come il Trattato di Lisbona sia stato sacrificato nel 
nome del bisogno di creare un diritto dell’Unione “Ersatz”, il quale risponde meglio 
alle esigenze immediate della riforma dell’Unione economica e monetaria. Ritiene 
che gli strumenti intergovernativi abbiano non soltanto “incostituzionalmente” 
requisito l’operato delle istituzioni dell’UE, bensì abbiano anche recato danno 
alla legittimità dell’Unione, costituendo un’amministrazione politica estranea alle 
esigenze della responsabilità democratica. La sottomissione della costituzione 
politica e sociale a quella economica conduce alla rinuncia del diritto ed al 
soggiogamento dell’integrità dell’ordinamento giuridico dell’Unione.
Parole chiave: UE, crisi economica, stato di diritto, federalismo esecutivo,  
 intergovernalismo.
